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Summary:
Providing credits seems to be an effective tool for improving the welfare of the pOOL It is expected
that microcredit funding to poor people wil expand rapidly over the coming years. if a sound
monitoring mechanism is not developed, Wiig argues that such a credit expansion may create
unintended negative effects.
Based on a Grameen Bank study, three problems or dilemmas related to credit expansion are
analysed: (i) Does a larger supply of microcredit increase the possibilty of cross-financing? (ii)
Does capital deepening tend to favour the best ("richest") of the poor? (iii) Does economic success
lead to poor repayment behaviour?
Survey methods revealing the extent of these problems are presented. It is argued that some of these
methods should be replicated by the implementing ageneies to improve the effecti veness of credit
provision to the pOOL
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1. Introduction 1
With the signing of the Microcredit Summt dec1aration and other initiatives, it is expected
that microcredit funding to poor people wil expand rapidly over the coming years. This
expansion in microcredit wil first of all take the form of capital widening, i.e. the creation
of new institutions supplying microcredit or existing institutions lending to new
customers. However, credit expansion also involves capital deepening, i.e. additional
credit to current borrowers from existing institutions. These two forms of credit expansion
are interlinked. New credit institutions initially expand their credit through capital
widening, while capital deepening becomes more important over time.
On the basis of a Grameen Ban (GB) study undertaken in 1995,2 this paper wil explore
survey methods which may reveal whether such microcredit expansion is viable in the
long run. Paricular attention is given to the respective viabilities of the provider and the
borrower.
The GB study focused on two problems which are common to most credit schemes and
are probably most significant in a capital deepening process. The first is whether the credit
contributed towards increasing outstanding debt, referred to as credit escalation. The
second is whether additional borrowing was motivated by the need to service existing
loans, referred to as cross-fnancing. With a c1ientele of poor borrowers, we needed
specially designed methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative, to monitor such
proeesses and assess their impact. Cross-financing deserves paricular attention because,
under conditions of steadily increasingsupply of microcredit, it is methodologically
diffcult to reveal whether cross-financing occurs. Jf cross-financing occurs on a large
scale, it may lead to a collapse of institutions when foreign donors withdraw their
subsidies from such activities. The risk is that the whole idea of providing microcredit for
the poor wil then be questioned. In the process of considering withdrawing par of its aid
to Grameen Bank, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) was
worred about such a scenario and commssioIied the study referred to above.
From the findings of the GB study, I focus on three dilemmas it identified. Firstly, an
increased supply of microcredit wil heighten the possibility of cross-financing. An
increased supply of credit could arise from capital deepening or widening or a combination
of these. Secondly, capital deepening tends to favour the richest of the poor - not the
poorest of the poor, which is the main target group of microcredit institutions. Thirdly,
economic success may lead to poor repayment behaviour. Rich borrowers are not always
the best borrowers from the point of view of a microcredit institution's financial viability.
The paper discusses the possibility of distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad' borrowers.
With such a screening method, it would be possible for an implementing agency to target
specifc credit packages on diferent types of borrowers.
i This paper was initially prepared as an input for the Consultative Group for Assisting the Poorest (CGAP) working group on Impact
Assessment Methodology's Virtual Conference in April 1997. A grant was obtained from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Afairs. I am indebted to Karin Ask, Alf Morten Jerve , Rashid Sumaila, Richard Morsom as well as the paricipants in the Virtual
Conference for valueable comments on an earlier draft.
2Ask K., A. Wiig and E. Sigvaldsen. 1997. "Repayment of old loans through new loans. Is cross-financing a problem for the
Grameen Bank?" Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway (R5:1997).
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The GB case is important, not only because of the role of GB as a model institution, but
because it is a mature microcredit institution which during recent years has experienced a
tremendous growth in loan disbursement. There are reasons to believe that the problems
experienced by GB may be repeated by other credit institutions in the future in their drive
to increase credit to the poor. As the Summts goal is put into practice, these problems
may be serious if sound monitoring mechanisms are not developed.
Neither the credit provider nor a social scientist can pick good projects. What they can
provide the borrower. is a well functioning institutional system takng into account the
incentive effects of different institutional arangements on theborrower's decisions, as
reflected in the dilemmas above. The focus of this paper is, however, on types of survey
methods that can be applied to collect information on the extent of these dilemmas, and on
the extent to which these methods can be adopted by an implementing institution. I wil
comment only briefly on issues of programe design and implementation.
In section 2, I wil star by presenting the GB study and its approach with respect to credit
escalation and cross-financing. The following three sections elaborate on the three
dilemmas above. Section 3 summarizes the analyses of the extent of cross-financing at an
aggregate leve!. Section 4 analyses the escalation of credits at an individual level and
which borrowers have escalated their credits. Section 5 analyses variations in repayment
performance between different groups of borrowers. Each section covers firstly an
elaboration of the dilemma; secondly, statistical approaches dealing with the dilemma; and
thirdly, whether the approaehes can be adopted by implementing ageneies. In section 6, I
conc1ude by drawing attention to the paricular problem of old borrowers (longtime current
borrowers).
2. Organisation of the GB study and some lessons
The questions addressed in the GB study required both quantitative and qualitative
research methodologies to assess both the extent of the problems of credit escalation and
cross-financing and the nature of the financial decision-makng takng place within the
framework of GB member households. Accordingly, the study was organised in the form
of a quantitative survey managed by myself, an economist by training, and a qualitative
survey managed by my colleague, Karn Ask, a social anthropologist. Par of the
qualitative survey preceded the quantitative survey and provided an input into the design
of the quantitative survey.3
The quantitative survey was a formal questionnaire survey of GB member households
within five GB branches under two zonal offces - Tangail and Rangpur. The respondents
were GB members present at the time the study team visited the different GB centres. Both
the five branches and the centres visited (five in each branch) were chosen by random
3 The Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), with which CMI has enjoyed Iong-stading cooperation, collected the data for the
quantitative sUrvey. A strength in the methodological approach is the combined approach of quantitative and quaIitative data gathering.
However, budget constraints made it diffcult to exploit this opportnity fully. Unexpected extra expenses are commonly incurred in
comparing and integrating the figures collected by different research methodologies.
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sampling. At each centre the team selected six respondents (with a few exceptions) among
those who were accessible. In this way, the survey inc1uded 298 households - 148 in
Tangail and 150 in Rangpur. The main objective of the quantitative survey was to generate
data on the relations between loan portfolios and repayment liabilities. The quantitative
survey also looked at differences in households' approaehes to servicing of loans.
The qualitative survey used a semi-strctured questionnaire to establish data on economic
activities and strategies in 85 individual households in Tangail and 40 in Mymensingh. In
addition, for comparson of data from the two sets of sources, L O respondents were
interviewed in Rangpur. We made a preliminar test of the questionnaire in Dhaka zone.
The empircal focus of the qualitative survey was theeconomic strategies of the
borrowers, I.e. their income generating activities, saving patterns, pattems of expenditure,
and the manner in which these strategies are influenced by the decision-makng proeesses
of the household.
Additional information was gathered through conversations with GB staff at different
levels and from a literature review. While visiting zonal offces in Rangpur, Dhaka,
Tangail and Mymensing, we also had group discussions with borrowers at centre
meetings.
On issues related to savings behaviour, several respondents declined to report their savings
outside the GB, whether in cash or kind. In addition, we are sceptical about putting too
much emphasis on the figures of gross and net income from projects funded by GB, parly
because a typical household was involved in various activities financed by several
different sources. It was therefore difficult to measure income generation from a paricular
GB project. Based on this observation, the analyses in sections 4 and 5 are based on data
for assets rather than on income figures.
In the termnology of Sebstad et.al. (1995),4 the study was based on a one tìme shot. It was
not based on time series, except for the respondents recall of previous weekly payments to
GB and some other variables. The surveys did not include any reference or comparison
group outside the GB system, since the main object of the study was cross-financing, not
whether GB members perform better than non-members. By analysing regional
differences, where we distinguished between old and new GB regions, development over
time was indirectly incorporated in the study.
3 Increased supply of credits may lead to cross-
fi nanci ng
It is general ly assumed that there is a c10se relationship between the viabilty of the
provider of credits and the viabilty of the borrower. This may direct the focus of analysis
4Sebstad J., C. Neil, C. Barnes and G. Chen. 1995. Assessing the impacts ofmicroenterprise interventions. A framework for
analysis. USAID Managing for Results, Working paper no 7. Center for Development Information and Evaluation.
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either to the borrower (intended beneficiar school) or to the provider (intermediate
school).
According to Hulme (1997)5 the intermediate school, mainly focuses on institutional
outreach and institutional sustainabilty while analysing impacts of rural financial
institutions (see Yaron, Benjamn and Piprek 1997).6 Jf outreach and institutional
sustainability are enhanced, the viability of the borrower is assumed to have improved.
From our GB study, however, we established that the viabilty of the microcredit
institution (MF is neither a necessar nor a suffcient condition for the viabilty of the
borrower or vice versa (at least in the medium term). Borrowers may use several sources
for repayment (e.g. other loans, own assets, income from other projects or members of the
household). Where the MF has strict monitoring mechanisms and borrowers have access
to several sources for funding, the financial viabilty of the MF is high while the viability
of the borrower is low. Only focusing on institutional viability is therefore misleading. In
section 5 we argue that the polar case, only focusing on the welfare effects on poor c1ients,
is also misleading. Both client and provider aspects need to be taken into account when
analysing impacts.
3.1 Elaboration of the dilemma and some indicators
The viability of any credit institution ultimately depends on the rate of repayment among
its borrowers. Many factors influence this rate, but in essence it is a function of two
paricular factors: the borrowers' financial abilty to repay and the credit institution's
abilty to enforce repayment discipline. GB is regarded as a success on both counts.
Studies show that GB borrowers in general have improved their economic well-being, and
GB reports a very high repayment ratio. The latter has to a large extent been attributed to
the core principles of the GB-model, namely group-based lending and peer monitoring.
The monitoring undertaken by the group members is, according to Stiglitz (1990), largely
responsible for the successful financial performance of GB.?
There has, however, been growing concern that the high repayment ratio may parly be
sustained through increased borrowing. The availability of credit for poor people in
Bangladesh has improved dramatically over the last decade. GB has rapidly expanded its
membership, and so have several NGOs providing credit. In addition, the informal credit
market is stil very much alive.
Borrowing from several sources is not a new practice in Bangladesh and the internal
famly economy is basically a cash economy where money is raised from whatever source
is available, according to the daily needs. Borrowing to repay another loan is thus
obviously not something that GB has introduced to rural Bangladesh: it has been there for
5Hulme, D. 1997. lmpact assessment methodologies for microfinance: A review. Discussion paper. CGAP working group on impact
assessment methodologies.
6 Yaron, J.,M. Benjamin and G.Piprek. 1997. Rural finance: Issues, design and best practices, Washington DC: Agriculture and
Natural Resources Department, World Bank
7 Stiglitz, J. 1990. "Peer monitoring and credit markets" The World Bank Economic Review, voL. 4, no. 3, p 351.
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a long period and is also a practice common in developed countres. Some cross-financing
wil always happen in connection with seasonal fluctuations in income and other events
requiring quick money.Cross-financingis therefore notalwaysbad. In general terms,
cross-financing becomes a problem when the borrower does not have the capacity to repay
and service the total outstanding debt.
The borrower faces several dangers by engaging in cross-financing. Cross-financing
depletes the capital of the loan, and reduces the value of the new loan that is used to repay
or service the old. It can turn into a vicious circle as smaller and smaller investments yield
less and less return, thus necessitating even higher loans the next time around to repay the
originalloan. It cuts away the profit from whatever activity the borrower has undertaken,
especially if a high interest loan is taken, e.g. from local money lenders.
The practice can be sustained for some time through takng more loans to repay ever
higher debt obligations, especially at a time where available credits from various sources
increase. However, it is doomed to collapse sooner or later, especially when the supply of
credit shrinks. The ban is then left with a defaulted loan and a borrower in high debt,
possibly in a situation even worse than when the person joined the credit institution. It is
very diffcult to assess the moment at which borrowing from several sources crosses the
boundar from being acceptable "overdraft" finaneing, to being a problem.
Due to imperfeet information, microcredit institutions may allow members to borrow
more than they can repay. The checking of loan usage has always been diffcult, but
appears even more diffcult in times of credit widening and deepening. The number of
members per centre in the GB system has been raised from 30 to 40, while the average
borrower has generally increased both the number of loans and the size of each loan. The
result may be a reduction of the monitoring capabilityof GB. ff the monitoring undertaken
by the group is not influenced by credit escalation or the introduction of additional types of
loans, such a reduction is, however, not a serious threat. Our study has little information
on these issues.
3.1.1 Indicators of credit escalation and cross-flnancing
We analysed the loan portfolio (general loans, seasonalloans, housing loans, loans from
group funds, and tube-wellloans) of the GB members covered by the quantitative survey.
Disbursements and outstanding amounts for each type of loan were averaged for all
respondents. Comparing loans disbursed with outstanding lo ans (outstanding in
percentage of disbursed) gave us an indication of the extent of credit escalation, or in other
words the extent to which GB members enter new loan obligations before full repayment
of previous loans. Since we did not collect a time series of outstanding loans, our reference
point was regional variation in outstanding loans as a percentage of disbursements. This
share was generally higher among respondents in regionslbranches where GB had been
involved for a long period. The credit escalation documented in old branches was mainly
found to be the result of the introduction of new types of loans (such as housing loans) to
old borrowers (a capital deepening proeess).
While outstanding loans and the number of active loans are treated as statie variables, and
time dynarcs are only indirectly treated by the concept of new and old borrowers/zones,
our final indicator of credit escalation was a dynarc one. The respondents weekly
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payments at the time she joined GB, one year ago and currently were collected. A
tremendous increase in weekly payments was found, indicating that an increasing
proportion oftheir income was used for repaying GB.
We also analysed two different sources for cross-financing.
3.1.2 Indicators of sources for cross-financing: Access to outside sources or additional
types of loans
In general, there are two ways that cross-financing can take place: either by combining
different types of loans from one paricular microcredit institution, or by combining an
internal loan with an outside source (loans from other microcredit institutions, friends or
moneylenders). In the GB context the two options were therefore:
i) GB loan combined with an outside source
The borrower can take an outside loan to repay instalments and/or interest on a GB loan.
This would happen at the end of the GB loan, when interest is due in week 5 L and 52. The
outside loan wil then be repaid immediately after receiving a new GB loan. Jf the outside
loan is financed by moneylenders, this would be an expensive type of cross-financing for
the borrower as the interest rate on the outside loan may be substantial. Borrowing from
the outside is normally more expensive than using GB loans, and there are thus seldom
direct financial incentives for the borrower to engage in cross-financing of this sort. Since
borrowers are not eligible to repay more than one instalment at a time (except for the last
10 instalments), it is even more costly to borrow from extemal sources to repay GB loans.
The costs of borrowing from other microcredit institutions are possibly lower than from
moneylenders. However, GB borrowers are not eligible to borrow from other microcredit
institutions, even though this is diffcult to contro!. An escalation of credits to microcredit
institutions may lead to a situation where such institutions are competing for borrowers,
makng cross-financing more likely (see Ebdon, 1994).8 This is a scenaro to avoid when
the Summts goal is put into practice.
Borrowing from friends and relatives is a normal practice In rural Bangladesh, but
generally such loans are small and not interest-bearing.
Respondents were asked to indicate other sources than GB loans they had access to (other
NGOs, bans, farers and traders, and friends and relatives) and whether such access was
higher than one year ago. Jf found to be higher, it may indicate that cross-financing might
develop. We were paricularly concemed with moneylenders, since such borrowing at high
costs may lead the borrower in to a debt trap. Generally, we found that the importanee of
moneylenders was less than one year ago, indicating that if the extent of cross-financing
have increased during this period, the availabilty of extemal sources, e.g. money-lenders,
was not the critical variable in explaining it.
8 Ebdon, R. 1994. "NGO expansion and the fight to reach the poor: Gender implications of a growing trend of encroachment in
Bangladesh." Paper presented at IDS, Sussex, 3-5 Nov. 1994.
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Questions were also designed to analyse the size of extemalloans and whether such loans
had escalated during the borrower's membership period (see sections 4 and 5).
ii) Combining GB loans
This method involves using one GB loan to repay another. After the introduction of
several new loan types, it is, for instance, possible to take a seasonalloan at the end of the
generalloan period and use it to repay the generalloan. The next step in the cycle would
be to use the new generalloan to repay the seasonalloan. This method may be sustained
longer than the first due to the lower interest rate on the loans involved.
The tyical GB respondent had. three active GB loans at the same time, which indicates
that cross-financing is possible for the majority of GB members. We analysed the bivariate
distribution between number of active loans and years of membership. Not surprisingly,
we found that older GB members had a larger number of active loans, indicating that
cross-financing might develop.
In section 3.2, the results ofplots ofborrowers' loan portfolios are presented, indicating the
possible extent of such internal cross-financing.
The two methods can also be combined, with both outside loans and several GB loans
mutually supporting each other. The end result is likely to be default (see section 5).
3.1.2 Indicators of when cross-financing becomes a problem
Cross-financing becomes a problem only when associated with a situation of long-term
inabilty to repay and service outstanding loans. We investigated some of the factors
determning repayment ability, looking at the economic units responsible for repayment -
their present status and their economic decision-makng, the economics of some typical
GB-financed projects, and lastly the monitoring by GB of these factors. The indicators
applied and our main findings are presented below. Looking at repayment abilities, we
distinguish between:
i) The economic status of GB members (their ownership of land and non-land
assets, their sex, age and education and finally their present occupation and whether it has
changed during their membership). The typical GB-member in our study was a maried
woman past her child bearng age, with little or no education. She was par of a larger
household with more than one male income earer and with some land. It was typically a
household with a potential for improving its economic status.
ii) The organisation of the household economy (gender division in households,
engagement in multiple intra- and inter-household activities, pattems of income
generation-, expenditure and loan repayment behaviour, non-project sources for repayment
and attitudes to payment of interest). We found that securing high and stable repayment
rates of GB loans depended upon intemal negotiations within the household to allocate
proceeds from different activities into debt servicing, and was not merelyamatter of
income generated by the GB-funded projects.
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3.2 Statistical method: Plots
A rough indicator of whether the borrower from a paricular microcredit institution may
use one type of loan, say A, to finanee instalments and interest payments on another type
of loan, say B, is the time-span between the disbursement of A and the termnation of B.
Jf, for instance, one respondent uses par of the seasonalloan to repay her generalloan, one
would expect the disbursement of the seasonal loan to be some weeks ahead of the
termnation of her generalloan.
Such an indicator of cross-financing depends on whether the borrower invests her loans
quickly or not. For all GB loans, we found that 90 % of the respondents invested at least
half of the loan during the first month of disbursement . It is costly not to invest the. money
immediately after disbursement, and we assumed that funds were invested very soon. By
analysing the borrower's total portfolio of loans (date of disbursement and expiry and loan
size), we were to some extent able to discover the possibilty ofwhether cross-financing
took place. Since the problem was expected to be highest for seasonalloans, we plotted
the disbursement date of the seasonal and general loans for each respondent in both
zones.9
Jf this plot had a specific pattern (e.g. if the plot is concentrated along, below or above an
angle of 45 degrees, both axes having the same scale), it indicated that the borrowers were
using one type of loan to repay another type of loan. This is based on the assumption that
funds are invested very soon. On the other hand, to the extent that seasonalloans generally
are given in specific months, we expected the plot to be concentrated along verticalline(s),
reflecting the season.
On such a basis, we were unable to observe any specific cOITelations between the months
of disbursement for the two loans. Hence, measured by this indicator of timing of
disbursement, we were unable to conclude that respondents were using seasonalloans on a
large scale to. repay general loans or vice versa. Similar plots for other types of lo ans
confirmed this result.
In the qualitative survey, we asked the respondents whether cross-financing occuITed, and
nine respondents confirmed it, but we expected respondents to under-report such activities.
This was also one reason for using indirect methods, such as the plots described above.
3.3 Replication by the implementing agency
Similar plots, or even more sophisticated plots and analyses (for instanee estimation of
correlation coeffcients), can easily be obtained by the monitoring unit in any microcredit
institution. By grouping borrowers according to some main characteristics and comparng
such plots at different points in time, it may be possible for the microcredit institution to
discover any specific pattern in repayment behaviour and whether borrowers act
strategically in their repayment behaviour.
9Since generalloans are given on a regular basis of one year, we used month of disbursement as a proxy for month of expiry. See
appendix L for a presentation of the plot for Tangail.
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In the GB case, data on disbursements and outstanding loans for each respondent are
available at the branch level and computerised at the centralIevel (such a system was
introduced recently in some but not all branches). Such data may be applied to the
monitoring of borrowers' performance and their escalation of credits in terms of both
capital deepening and widening. However, applying these plots wil only reveal the
possibility of internal cross-financing. It wil not reveal the extent of cross-financing
through other extemal sources. Neither wil it reveal whether cross-financing is a problem
or not. These problems wil be taken up in sections 4 and 5, respectively.
4 Capita I deepening tends to favour the Irichl
GB as well as CGAP's ultimate goal is to reach the poorest of the poor by providing
credits. On the basis of the GB study, this section analyses whether GB in fact reaches the
poorest and if not, propose a mechanism which explains why.
4. 1. Elaboration of the dilemma
From a credit institution financial viability point of view, it is best that those borrowers
having high outstanding loans general ly correspond to those who are best able to service
the loans. A borrower's abilty to service a loan depends on the income of the household
from multiple projects of which pars are funded by credits from the credit institution in
question. The pooling of income therefore makes it diffcult to measure the impact on
household income of a paricular loan (see sections 2 and 3.1.3).
There is an intemal growth dynamic in the supply of microfinance, both in the sense that a
borrower does not achieve additional loans of a paricular type before current loans are
repaid, and because acquiring new types of loan requires good repayment performance on
old loans. Normally, additionalloans of the same type are higher than the old ones and
entering new types of loans adds to outstanding debt. The credit escalation documented in
section 3 was mainly a result of capital deepening (old borrowers takng new types of
loan).
To the ex tent that repayment of previous lo ans is an indicator of the projects success,
capital deepening indicates that borrowers are climbing up the socialladder and are likely
at some point to move out of the very poor group. This is also the ultimate goal of any
microcredit institution such as GB. While these borrowers represent the evidence of the
institution's success, at the same time their economic transformation may alienate the bank
from its ideological foundation as a bank for the 'poorest.
From a microcredit institution's ideological point of view, giving a large par of their
credits to the successful borrowers may not conform with their social objectives, but may
increase the financial viabilty of the institution. A conventional bank wil never punish a
successful borrower by refusing additional loans under such circumstances, but a
microcredit institution ought to have some principles or thresholds determning when a
borrower is not eligible for additional borrowings, even though the incentive effects of
ending further lo ans to successful borrowers may be severe. GB also found it diffcult to
termnate repeat lending to the successful borrowers.
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4.2 Statistical method: regression analysis of what determines the
size of loans
Credit escalation takes the form of increasing the disbursement of loans. This section
focuses on what factorsdetermne the amount of credit allowed to individual borrowers. Is
it generally the case that borrowers with high lo ans are also those with the best ability to
service loans? More specifically, is it the case that the 'rich' generally obtain larger loans
than the 'poor'? Whether the rich, in fact, perform better than the poor is analysed in
section 5.
We applied aregression analysis where the dependent varable was the respondents total
disbursement of GB loans at a paricular time. io Our independent varables were factors
perceived to influence repayment abilty.
Jf loan size increases with the respondents' available assets, this would be a good sign for
potential repayments to GB. In the last instance, the borrowers' economic viability
influences the viability of GB. As a ban which gives non-collateralloans, GB needs the
borrowers' assets or incomes from their projects to enable them to maintain or reduce their
liabilties to the ban. We also expect that the viabilty of the ban wil decrease with the
level of the respondents' financialloans outside the GB system.
In the analysis of assets and income, we distinguished between several varables:
ownership of land, the extent of land purehasing, non-land assets (value of cattle etc.) and
the number of male/female earers in the household, but did not include any direct
indicator of income. In addition we registered zone. Regarding non-institutional loans
(from the informal sector), we distinguished between those borrowers who at present have
higher and lower informalloans than at the time of joining GB.
In addition to assets and income, we also expected that the viability of GB would increase
with the quality of information gathered about the respondents. We used the period of
membership and the borrower's repayment behaviour (the frequency of missed
instalments) as proxies for information.
The results showed that respondents who (i) have been members of GB for a long period
and (ii) have bought land and have high assets gene rally have larger loans than other
respondents .
In addition, the zone is significant in explaining the borrowers' loan size. The number of
earers per household and the extent of borrowing in the informal market are insignificant
varables. Those borrowing more from non-institutional sources now than at the time they
joined GB have smaller loans. The above varables explain nearly 50 per cent of the
varation in the loan size.
IOTotal loan except housing loans. We have also undertaken analyses inc1uding housing loans, but the results are generally the same.
See appendix 2 for a presentation of the results. No independence test has been carried out for the independent variables. This
could be a possible improvement of the analysis in the future.
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From GB's financial viability point of view, the above results seem positive. Borrowers
who (i) have large loans from the informal market, (ii) miss their instalments frequently
and (iii) have an extremely low levelofassetsdonot have large loans in GRIn Telation to
its ideological foundation, however, the results indicate that the 'best of the poor' have
higher access to loans than the very poorest. In fact we found that the average land
holdings of the respondents were higher than the criteria of eligibility for acquiring lo ans
in the GB system.
As pointed out by the GB, the land holdings were high as a result of its success.
However, we did not have time series to test such a hypothesis.
4.3 Replication by an implementing agency
Any microcredit institution with the pnmar object of reaching the very poor requires
information on the distribution of its loans between different categories of borrowers.
Borrowers may be categorised in terms of i) their economic status, e.g., whether credits
are going to the destitute or to other poor groups, and ii) household characteristics, for
instance the number of earers in the household. Conceming i), we found it easy to collect
credible data on sex, age, education and household assets and expenditure, but not on
income. Conceming ii), respondents were not unwiling to report household
characteristics. Except for the danger of overloading, the monitoring information unit in a
microcredit institution could probably obtain similar data of key classification varables for
its borrowers. An additional requirement for giving loans could be that borrowers provide
such information. As far as I know, such individual data sets have hardly been used by any
microcredit institution in monitoring its borrowers.1 i On the other hand, in formal credit
markets such tools are very common.
From the financial viabilty point of view, it is probably of equal importanee that
borrowers are able to service their loans than for loans to reach the target group. For
example, to the extent that the destitute are not able to service their loans, a contradietion
may arse between these two objectives. Obtaining information on key classification
varables, as well as on borrowers' outstanding debt, makes it possible to reveal whether
one reaches the target group or not. One is also able to ascertain the financial viability of
the institution's loan portfolio.
It wil probably be difficult to collect unbiased figures for extemalloans, as attempted in
our GB study. It should be possible to collect data on other varables, such as assets (land,
cattle, etc.) and the number of earers in the household. On such a basis, the implementing
agency may analyse factors determning the size of the borrower's loan. It could also be
possible to undertake time series analysis. Such an analysis could be used further in
determning when loans are to be termnated.
"Monique Cohen brought to my attention during the Virtual Meeting that ADEMI in the Dominican Republic tracks their c1ients'
enterprise assets, sales and levels of employment. Richard Morsom has later informed me that the Zimbabwe's Social
Development Fund has undertaken a similar practice.
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5 Economic success may lead to poor repayment
behaviour
A distinction should be made between abilty and willngness to repay loans. Even though
an impact assessment analysis shows that borrowers are improving their welfare, such a
welfare improvement may lead to a change in repaymentbehaviour as the borrower's
outside opportunities may rise. Jf welfare improvement leads to weaker financial discipline
in terms of repayment behaviour, it may threaten the viabilty of the credit institution in
question. Hence, the improved viabilty of the borrower does not necessarily lead to
improved viabilty of the MF.
5. 1 Elaboration of the dilemma
The spirit of the Microcredit Summt declaration is, of course, based on the assumption
that providing poor people with credit has a positive impact on their welfare, but equally
important is the assumption that poor people generally act as good borrowers. However,
there may be important socio-culturally determned differences in attitudes towards paying
interest and coping with debt, and borrowers may develop different strategies for coping
with debt. In a social context where it is normal not to repay loans, as, for instance, with
formal lending in Bangladesh, the escalation of credit to the poor may not be viable in the
long run.
Coping strategies may also change during a borrower's membership period. For instance,
'old' borrowers may increase their available assets as well as their outside opportunities.
They may also become less risk averse. Under such circumstances, . the termnation of
additional loans may not act any longer as a disciplining device for encouraging good
repayment behaviour. Borrowers who are assumed best able to repay their loans, for
instance, those with high assets (see section 4), may in fact cause serious problems to a
credit institution.
5.2 Statistical method: logistic regression of inter-group variation
in servicing of loans
We distinguished between two types of borrowers: good and bad borrowers. In our
analysis good borrowers were defined as those who only seldom or never miss their
instalments, while bad borrowers were those who often or occasionally missed their
instalments.I2
We began by analysing indicators of how 'good' and 'bad' borrowers serviced their loans,
and proceeded with a statistical analysis.
i Good borrowers i
12 The categories are defined according to the borrowers' own perceptions. Our plan was to use defaulters as a classification variable,
but hardly anyone categorized themselves as a defaulters, which made this impossible.
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The respondents who answered that they missed their instalments seIdom, rarely or never,
were asked how the household was able to service their loans to GB. The respondents
rated the degree of importanee of different explanations. The single most important source
of financing instalments was the income generated by the activities which were funded by
GB loans. The second most important source of finaneing was wages. This means income
from activities outside the GB system and possibly from other household members (male
labour). Neither formal nor informalloans were found to be important in the process of
repaying the loans.
'Bad borrowers'
The respondents having diffculties paying their instalments were asked to rate the
importanee of five possible explanations for this. We found that for those borrowers
having problems in terms of paying their instalments, the incomes generated from the
projects financed by GB lo ans seemed to be too low. llness seems to be an additional
explanation of the problems faced by the respondents.
Results from a logistic regression analysis
This analysis is an attempt to test the degree of importanee of different varables
explaining iregular behaviour (missed instalments) and paricularly whether economic
success and credit escalation had a significant effect on borrowers' behaviour. As
mentioned in section 3, cross-financing is hardlyaproblem for the ban as long it does not
influence repayment behaviour. Here, we used a logistic regression analysis (a regression
analysis where the dependent varable has two values), and as above we distinguished
between two types ofborrower.
The explanatory varables used to distinguish good from bad borrowers were grouped as
follows:
i) indicators of economic success:
-the borrowers' assets (e.g.land area, value of other assets as animals), but not
their income
-land bought during the previous year
-land shared in/out during last season (aman)
-period of time as a GB member.
ii) Indicators of credit escalation and cross-financing:
-totalloans from other sources than GB
-whether they have increased their borrowings outside the GB system during
their membership period (e.g. from the informal credit market)
-number of active GB loans.
iii) Other possible explanations
-the number of earers per household
-the zone.
Some comments on the choice of independent varables are in order. The period of time as
a GB member is important for at least two reasons: firstly, according to Khandker et al
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(1995:92),13 the longer the branch works the more likely it is to lend to bad borrowers or
projects. Different and opposing proeesses may apply to new and old members. On the
one hand,both the borrower and GB acquire more information through experience. Over
time GB acquires information about the borrower's tye and repayment behaviour
(whether she is an irregular borrower), while the borrower acquires business experience.
On the other hand, borrowers may have a decreasingretum to investment, i.e. new
members may generate good projects while old members add on bad projects. In addition,
old borrowers may be richer, become less risk averse and have better outside opportunities
than new borrowers. The threat of termnation due to defaults may therefore be a stronger
disciplining device for new members.
Other mechanisms may work for old members. Ban workers may become more relaxed
towards the monitoring of projects undertaken by old members, and borrowers may lear
how to fool the system. What is the net effect ofthese opposing mechanisms? Is it the case
that being an old member increases the probabilty of being a bad borrower?
Regarding the borrowers' assets as a varable, in a country like Bangladesh where land is
such a scarce resource, one may expect that investment in land is the paramount goal of
the borrower. Is it the case that borrowers who invest in land are more concemed with
securing access to land than with repaying their instalments to GB on time? Or is it the
case that those who have invested heavily in land generally acquire a surplus and therefore
act as regular borrowers? Do borrowers having assets of one type or another pay their
instalments more regularly than others?
By using the number of earners per household as a proxy for the extent of income pooling
in the household, we tested the effects of pooling on the repayment ratios. We also tested
whether irregular borrowers had increased their loans from the informal credit market and
whether there were regional diferences in repayment behaviour.
These questions were addressed by a logistic regression analysis.
The main findings were the following (see appendix 3). Only two variables were
significant in explaining the frequency of missed instalments. The probability of irregular
behaviour increased with the number of years of GB membership, while the probability
decreased with the number of earners per household. These results may support the
hypotheses of decreasing retums to scale, and that the pooling of resources in the
household makes it possible to handle repayments to GB.
Even though it was found that the number of loans taken at the same time by the
respondent increased the probability of missed instalments, this relationship was not
significant. It is also noteworthy that the borrowers' assets in terms of land increased the
probabilty of irregular behaviour. Land owned was significant at a 10 per cent level.14
13 S.R. Khandker, B KhaIiy and Z. Kahn. 1995. "Sustainability of Grameen Bank: What do we know?" Paper presented at a
workshop in Dhaka, 19-23 March, 1995.
14Even though investments in land increase the probability of missed instalments, this is not a serious problem to the GB as long as
the borrower may use her assets or income to repay her obligations and thereby avoid being a defaulter. In a Bangladeshi context
one would expect that investments in land would generates a surplus while at the same time actff as a type of collateral.
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Based on the analysis above, one can hardly conclude that increasing the loan portfolio
increases the probabilty of irregular repayment behaviour. We also found that irregular
behaviour tended to increase with economic success, measured both by the number of
years as a GB member and by borrowers' available assets. Based on these results, we
wared against a misplaced institutional emphasis on the number of loans. A topic that
should be addressed, however, is the problem of irregular behaviour among old members
(see section 6).
5.3 Replication by an implementing agency
Any financial institution needs information about its borrowers' financial situation. IT
paricular groups face common problems, it may be possible to initiate specific
programes for them.
In addition to the data on indicators of economic status and household characteristics (see
section 4.3), it should be possible to collect and computerise data on whether a borrower is
a defaulter or not. It could also be possible to computerise the extent of missed
instalments. Whatever indicator is chosen for irregular behaviour, it could be possib1e to
analyse what factors determne it. As long as the independent varables are computerised,
such an analysis is easy to implement.
The main operational recommendation following from the analysis of this section is the
principle of screening borrowers according to their ability and willngness to repay their
loans. Based on such a screening proeess, credit institutions may be targeting different
loan packages to different groups of borrowers. While the importanee of such a screening
proeess is evident to 'mature' credit institutions, in which capital growth takes the form of
capital deepening, such screening is even more important in a con text where reaching 100
millon poor people by successful microcredit schemes is the ultimate goal, as reflected in
the Summts goal. Only strict monitoring mechanisms can justify such an expansion. The
screening of borrowers form one par of such a monitoring proeess.
6. Conclusion - or what to do with old borrowers
The Microcredit Summts goal of credit expansion may have some unintended effects.
Expanding credits from whatever source makes it easier for the borrower to use one type
of loan to repay another type of loan (cross-financing). It can have adverse effects on the
monitoring capabilty of the credit institution as well as on the monitoring at group leve!.
An increased supply of credit reduces its price and may lead paricular types of borrowers
to engage in risky projects. These effects may lead to bad repayment behaviour, which
subsequently undermnes the whole idea of giving credit to the poor. To sustain the
growing levels of public support for microcredit, microcredit institutions wil have to
develop additional monitoring tools which make it possible to reveal such effects. Without
adequate counter-measures, the increase in credits to the poor may not give the expected
results.
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Based on a Grameen Ban study, three dilemmas related to credit expansion were
analysed and possible survey methods revealing the extent of these problems were
presented.
The following problems were raised:
i) Does an increased supply ofmicrocredit increase the possibility of cross-
financing?
ii) Does capital deepeìiing tend to favour the richest of the poor?
iii) Does economic success lead to poor repayment behaviour?
With established nucrocredit institutions, it is argued that cross-financing is most likely to
occur through additional intemal borrowing (capital deepening). GB has experienced
single defaults in the magnitude of TK 50,00 (US D 1200), where the borrower had
obviously been allowed to borrow above her capacity to repay. For old branches, the
potential for dangerous cross-financing is the highest. The oldest branches have members
of many years' standing. They have been allowed a number of different loans and have
increased their total outstanding debt gradually.
For new institutions, cross-financing is more likely to take the form of borrowing from
different microcredit institutions at the same time. An escalation of credit or grants to
microcredit institutions may lead to a situation where such institutions are competing for
borrowers, which makes cross-financing more likely.
From the surveys undertaken for the GB study, however, there is no evidence that credit
escalation had developed into a pathological state of cross- jinancing. Nevertheless, it
appears that old borrowers are more likely to become 'bad' borrowers, but not as a result of
impoverishment. To the contrar, most old borrowers have improved their economic
situation.
The GB study shows that those having big loans generally tend to be 'rich' in terms of
assets. While capital widening tends to favour the poor, capital deepening tends to favour
the rich, and GB has no institutional mechanisms preventing further lending to successful
borrowers.
Old borrowers raise new challenges for the Ban. In as much as they represent the
evidence of GB's success, their economic and social transformation gradually alienates
them from the ideological foundation of GB as the 'poor women's bank'. The rural middle
class in Bangladesh represents cultural values and economic strategies different from the
exploited poor. It is within the framework of such middle class values and strategi es that
speculative investments, credit escalation and cross-financing become more probable.
Even though their knowledge of business and financial matters has improved, it also
seems likely that ways of 'fooling' the system have been leart. At this leve! of financial
competence, one way of doing it is by lending to each other and engage in risky business
without GB's knowledge. A factor makng old borrowers more likely to engage in risky
business ventures is that the Ban workers at old branches themselves may become more
relaxed and not as rigorous in their loan checking as they would have been at a newer
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branch. Members who have repaid loans regularly for ten years are not likely to have their
personal financial status rechecked every time they apply for a loan.
Discipline is likely to be more slack among older borrowers and in some instances the
groups and centres may actually be difficult to control for the branch workers. The intemal
culture at some branches may in other words be conducive to adjustment. The final result
may be that old borrowers add on bad projects. Jf this is the case, as our study indicates,
the problem faced by GB is not cross-financing per se, but how to tackle the specific
problems faced by one particular group, the old members.
GB is stil considering how older members can be better accommodated and how the
increased disparties in activity profies can be adequately covered by the programe. The
current system, with a number of lo ans for very specific purposes, may need to be
changed. Several options are available. One option is a system where everybody is given
an individual credit limit for the basic types of loan, and eventually a credit limit for all
GB loans. A second option is to improve the capacity to appraise projects. A third option
is adhering more strictly to rules for termnating the membership in case of default. An
additional option would be a limited period of eligible membership.
At a more generallevel, any microcredit institution should diversify its credit instruments
to adjust for changes in borrowers' economic situation, social and economic aspirations
and attitudes towards financial institutions. However, it requires a sophisticated screening
process of members, some of which are discussed in this paper. Most of these methods can
be replicated by implementing agencies in their monitoring of credit expansion. What is
needed is a computerised database of individual borrowers' performance and
characteristics (tracking records). Without such a screening or monitoring process,
expansion of microcredit may have severe undesired effects.
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Appendix 1
Disbursement months of respondents having general and seasonal
loans. Tangail i
+- - - - - - - - -- - - -- - -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- --- -- - ---- -- -- - - ---
12 1 1 1 1 1
11 1 2 2
10 1 1 2 1 2
9 2 5 1
8 1 1 2 2 1
7 2 2 1 2
6 1 1 2 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 4 1
4 2 1 1 1 2 1 1
1 1 2 2
2 1 2 2 1
1 1 1 2 2 1
+- -- - --------------- ---- - - -- -- - -- --- ---------------- --------------+
1 5 7 11
2 4 6 8 10 12
Seasonal loan rnonth
l 112 respondents have both seasonal and generalloans in Tangail while the corresponding
figure is 123 in Rangpur. The numbers given in the seatter plots reflect the number of cases
hav ing a specific combination of month of disbursement for the two types of loans.
l
Appendix 2 What determines the loan size? Results from the regression
analysis
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
Zone; 0= Rangpur
L = Tangail
Value of other assets in TK (goat, cattles, poultries and machinery, but
not housing)
No. of years the respondent has been a member of GB
Male + female earners/ Household size
Land bought in last one year
Missed installments;
O = SeIdom, rarely or never
L = Of ten or occasionally
7.. NONINSTL The respondent is currently borrowing more from moneylenders or
non-institutional sources than before joining GB.
O=No
L = Yes
8.. LOWND Land owned (deeimaIs)
1. DIS T 
2.. TNLAEXC
3.. GBMEM
4.. A VEEARN
5.. LBT
6.. HOFTEN
Variable(s) Removed on Step Number
9.. AVEEARN
10.. NONINSTL
Multiple R .68611
R Square .47074
Regression; 6 degrees of freedom
Residual; 277 degrees of freedom
F = 41.06235 Signif F = .0000
------------------ Variabies in the Equation ------------------
Variable B T Sig T
DIST 4806.35 9.2 .0000
TNLAEXC .07 5.4 .0000
GBMEM 546.85 7.5 .0000
LBT 76.72 2.6 .0094
HOFTEN -1494.86 -1.7 .0857
LOWND 7.83 2.6 .0102
(Constant) 2388.63 3.9 .0002
------------- Variables not in the Equation -------------
Variable
A VEEARN
NONINSTL
T Sig T
-.734
-1.27 i
.4634
.2046
Appendix 3
What detennnes being a 'good' versus 'bad' borrower?
Results from a logistic regression analysis
Dependent variable: How of ten missed instalments
L Of ten or occasionally
O Seldomlnever
Independent variables:
DIST Zone; O = Rangpur
L = Tangail
TNLAEXC Value of other assets in TK (goat, cattles, poultries and machinery, but
not housing)
No. of years the respondent has been a member of GB
Male + female earners/ Household size
Land bought in last one year
The respondent is currently borrowing more from money lenders or
non-institutional sources than before joining GB.
O=No
1 = Yes
Land owned (deeimaIs)
Land shared in during aman season
Land shared out during aman season
Totalloans to others than GB
Number of current GB loans
GBMEM
A VEARN
LBT
NONINSTL
LOWND
AMANIN
OUT
TOTTK
GB LOANS
Results:
Variable
GBMEM
A VEEARN
Constant
LOWND
TNLAEXC
DIST
LBT
AMANIN
AUT
GBLOANS
NONINSTL
TOTTK
B
.2752
-2.4999
-3.5104
3.0036
.9622
2.6802
2.8823
.4498
.3010
.0768
.0962
1.4787
Sig
.0000
.0436
.0000
.0831
.3266
.1016
.0896
.5024
.5833
.7817
.7564
.2240
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